Recently, one of our readers approached me with a simple question:
“What do you tell me about the KBA Rapida 75? IIt seems to be a decent machine at a reasonable price, manufactured by a reputable company.”
Indeed, on these pages we often discuss Heidelberg presses. What about the others? The market might seem dominated by one manufacturer, and competitors have long fought for a place beside it. Of course this is not true. During my own years with Heidelberg, we constantly faced the pressure of lower-priced machines from rivals. Time to look back and ask: did those alternatives stand the test of time?
By coincidence, we recently inspected two identical KBA Rapida 75 presses, both built in 2008, with consecutive serial numbers. What we found was revealing.
To say it in advance: these presses proved temperamental. As they aged, a remarkable number of recurring faults appeared. As problems were discovered, KBA tried to fix them, but this only happened in later models. Judging by the service history of the units we examined, the Rapida 75 has turned out to be a printing machine with a notably high cost of ownership.
But let’s start at the beginning.
Our story will not be so much about the Rapida 75, which unexpectedly changed its target audience and led to serious changes in the printing equipment market as a whole. Let’s take a look at how the Rapida printing press line has developed over the course of its existence – this will give us an opportunity to understand why KBA never returned to the packaging market in the half-format printing press segment.
The history of the Rapida series began long before 2008, when the first Czech machine appeared.
König & Bauer has been showcasing sheetfed printing presses under the Rapida brand since the late 1960s, and by the early 1990s it already had a full range of formats — from the half-format Rapida SRO 72 (52 × 72 cm) to large-format models.

The late 1980s were a turning point: printing equipment became faster, electronics more reliable, and manufacturers began abandoning the old planetary and tandem configurations in favor of the now-standard unit-type design.
Contrary to popular belief, the so-called planetary configuration—with a common impression cylinder (CIC)—was notinvented by Planeta or even KBA. The name Planeta itself came from the planetary gear train, not from a “planetary” layout of satellite printing units around a central cylinder.
Around 1990, KBA replaced its outdated planetary SRO with the unit-type Rapida 72. The new model has got the maximal speed of 15 thousand impressions per hour ran faster and far more stably. These sturdy “workhorses” gained a reputation for simplicity and low cost. They came with automatic wash-up devices, optional densitometric control, and a short inking unit with 14 rollers.
Users noted the perfection of the electronics in the new series of machines and their technical equipment. The new machine was both simple and well thought out. The ‘7 o’clock’ cylinder design allowed fairly thick cardboard to be processed without dirtying the rear edge of the sheet. Most breakdowns were minor, and the machine could be repaired ‘on the spot’. But most importantly, the sectional layout allowed for a significant increase in the machine’s operating speed.

The only drawback worth mentioning is the short inking unit. KBA’s philosophy was that it should be both responsive and high-capacity. The inking unit had only 14 rollers, albeit with a large diameter.
This feature turned out to be both an advantage and a disadvantage. But alas, nothing in this world is universal. On the one hand, it allowed for quick cleaning and ink changes, but on the other hand, it made it difficult to reproduce large solid areas during long runs.
Operators complained about the appearance of patterns, and the ink did not hold well. KBA disagreed with these opinions for many years, and the concept remained in place until the end of production of the Rapida 74 series.
The Colortronic console offered standard features typical of the early 1990s: side and circumferential registration, colour zone adjustment and general machine diagnostics.
Non-functioning printing units could be switched off individually. Thanks to double-diameter cylinders, the printing press could handle materials up to 0.8 mm thick, which made it popular with packaging manufacturers.

Interestingly, the old SRO72 model did not disappear completely: in 1995, KBA introduced the Rapida 72 K, a two-colour version based on it. Marketed as the fastest sheetfed printing press in the world, it even made it into the Guinness Book of Records for achieving a speed of 18,000 impressions per hour in the late 1990s.
With the dawn of the CIP3 era, the Rapida 74 became the logical successor to the printing press, with a slightly larger sheet format (52 × 74 cm), higher speed (15,000 sheets per hour) and more configuration options, including varnishing, double-sided printing and others. It was unveiled in a new design at DRUPA 2004 and immediately attracted attention with its modern appearance.
This model became the swan song of KBA Rapida half-format presses throughout their entire history. Even today, these presses remain relevant.
In this model, KBA also offered an optional economical ink fountain system with dividers. If the customer planned to print jobs with rainbow effect, he could load several colours into one ink fountain and use them for special jobs, such as printing secure documents, where axial oscillation can be disabled.

In the mid-2000s, KBA experimented with waterless offset, launching versions with the Gravuflow short inking unit (covered earlier on PressInspection).
The relative simplicity of the design with effective technical solutions, as well as an affordable price at 70% of the Heidelberg price, made this model quite popular in its early years. Printing machines manufactured between 2004 and 2008 are still in demand and often sell for higher prices than some newer generation models.
Compared to Heidelberg’s CP2000-equipped machines, the Rapida 74 lagged technologically, but its true problem was cost of manufacturing.
By the mid-2000s it had become expensive to produce in Germany: high labor and assembly costs forced KBA to seek a cheaper B2-format platform. The company couldn’t price the 74 against Heidelberg—it was simpler in design and aimed at a different buyer.
The model’s commercial failure coincided with the bankruptcy of Czech manufacturer Polly in Dobruška—the same town where ADAST had once built presses. In 2005 KBA purchased the facility, its engineering documentation, and staff, turning it into KBA-Grafitec. All B2 production was moved there.
An internal report I once saw stated that only seven Rapida 74 printing presses were assembled in 2007, after which production in Germany was discontinued.
The Rapida 75 was introduced in 2008. Objectively speaking, it was not a 100% German machine. In fact, for some time, KBA even continued to produce the old Polly and Performa models under its own brand and in new colours, gradually modernising them. These included the Rapida 75 and 75E, followed shortly afterwards by the 75 PRO. At the same time, the Performa 66/74, a machine typical of the Czech Republic and intended for entry-level printing houses, remained in production.
Thus, the Rapida 75 became the cost-optimised successor to the German 74, combining KBA’s experience with the simpler design of the Polly, with an emphasis on compactness, affordability and moderate automation.
The Rapida 75 made its debut at drupa 2008, and then active deliveries began in Europe and the United States.
Technically, it was familiar to novice printing houses from Polly factory products: a compact frame, continuous gear drive, 7 o’clock cylinder geometry, double transfer cylinders, a maximum speed of 15,000 sheets per hour and formats of 530 × 750 mm (optionally 605 × 750 mm). Configurations ranged from 2 to 8 colours, with optional double-sided printing and varnishing.
In 2011, the Rapida 75 E was introduced, a more affordable version that made it easier for small print shops to enter the market, and in 2016, the Rapida 75 PRO with a larger sheet format, TouchTronic console, faster makeready and partial standardisation with larger Rapida models.
However, consumers did not appreciate the sharp change in direction – after the high-tech Rapida 74, the company switched to entry-level machines, which were once operated by ADAST Dominant 700 and later by Polly. And already in 2012, KBA acknowledged that the ‘small-format Rapida 75 manufactured by KBA-Grafitec’ had not met sales expectations. The reasons given for the reduction in production were fierce competition and a decline in the number of printing houses working in B2 format. Nevertheless, KBA did not abandon the production of half-format machines.
Although the company’s hopes shifted to the more automated Rapida 76, which appeared in 2013, these machines never achieved the popularity of the Rapida 72 model.
But let’s return to the Rapida 75, which was produced from 2008 to 2012. Although the machine was positioned as a state-of-the-art solution from Koenig & Bauer, its Czech origins were obvious to everyone. It was still the same lightweight, compact design of a half-format printing press from Polly, optimised for economical print runs and quick preparation for printing.
Many mechanical solutions and maintenance methods were inherited directly from the Dobruška factory — feeders, sheet transport, lubrication system, even component suppliers. But with the factory’s transition to KBA, the plant gained new suppliers and a quality control system.
From an analytical point of view, the launch of the Rapida 75 was KBA’s last attempt to stay in the B2 segment. However, printing companies often noted the higher downtime and cost of ownership of the 75 compared to competing Heidelberg SM74 or MAN Roland 202 printing presses of the same format. Although such opinions mainly come from user forums rather than factory data, they show how the market perceived this model.
But most importantly, users were puzzled by the fact that KBA had previously targeted advanced users, especially packaging manufacturers, but suddenly changed its target audience. The Rapida 75 marked a return to a simpler, entry-level concept for beginners. This is how it was perceived by the market.
KBA’s sudden exit from the premium B2 machine segment gave a boost to sales of Japanese Ryobi machines, particularly the 784 and 700 series. So much so that it even affected MAN Roland’s sales. But we’ll talk about that another time.
Almost 20 years have passed since the start of production of the Rapida 75, which significantly changed the market for half-format machines from all manufacturers. We can now look back on it with the benefit of hindsight and identify its advantages and disadvantages that have become apparent over the years of operation.
Very compact footprint and compatibility with CIP3/CIP4 format
Low declared power consumption
Rated speed up to 15,000 impressions per hour
Flexible configuration: 2–8 colors, perfecting, coating, and optional US format (605 × 750 mm)
In the PRO version — faster makeready and modern interface
Laser-zoned duct blade, reducing uneven wear


The model was outdated from the outset, with mostly mechanical adjustments. Preparing for printing took longer and resulted in more waste. Given the rising cost of labour in Europe, this model could only find a market in certain countries where printing speed was not a priority. KBA itself later acknowledged in its brochures on the Rapida 75 PRO that it was only through the introduction of automatic plate mounting, the more advanced CleanTronic washing system and DensiTronic control that it was able to reduce waste and start-up time.
The feeder design, with rollers and brushes plus two vacuum belts, was already outdated in 2008 and sensitive to paper trimming accuracy.
Manual lubrication required at numerous points; forgetting it led to wear, play, and sheet loss inside the press. Strangely enough, this problem was observed on ALL first-generation Rapida 75 printing presses manufactured between 2008 and 2010 that were inspected.
Limited availability of spare parts: small production run means many sensors or motors must be ordered individually from KBA with long lead times.
Electronics proved unreliable; registration motors in print units often failed.
New motors are expensive and cannot be found on the secondary market. One well-known dealer of printing equipment even concealed faulty motors during a demonstration of his printing machine at his warehouse before our inspection.
On all 2008 machines inspected, the Baldwin dryer monitor was damaged.
Failures of ductor drive motors are widespread; it is said that replacements now cost around €6,000 each and exist only in old stock.
Sheet-loss incidents inside the delivery section occasionally led to fires when unnoticed. It is also very telling that the problem was found on both inspected cars of the same generation.
On the secondary market, the Rapida 75 has consistently fetched lower prices than the “icons” of its class (Heidelberg SM/XL 74, Komori Lithrone 28/29).
This reflects its positioning as an economical semi-format press from Dobruška—bad news for sellers, but a plus for bargain-hunters.
Essentially, the KBA Rapida 75 was KBA’s Czech attempt to maintain its position in the half-format machine market. The model was born out of the Polly/Performa engineering developments and was conceived as an inexpensive alternative to the expensive German RA 74.
Designed for entry-level printing houses, it was simplified both mechanically and electronically. The inherited Czech design inevitably affected its durability: after a few years of operation, weaknesses began to appear.
The machine was adequate for the entry-level market, but like any primarily mechanical printing machine, it required disciplined maintenance. Many owners neglected lubrication or dismantled unused units for spare parts.
As a transitional generation, the 75 found itself between two eras — its weak points were later corrected in the 75 PRO and 76. When choosing a printing press today, I would rather pay attention to the earlier Rapida 74 or the later Rapida 76.
If you come across a ‘bargain’ Rapida 75, approach it with caution. A well-maintained example can still print beautifully, but it will not be cheap to run. Expect a price similar to that of a Speedmaster SM 74. However, all other things being equal, a Heidelberg in poorer technical condition remains the safer choice.
Every Rapida 75 on the market deserves a thorough inspection: any malfunction can cost not only money, but also weeks of downtime.
In short, despite the minimal electronics and the large number of weak points of this printing machine
By the mid-2010s, this model had naturally given way to the 75 E / 75 PRO, and technological leadership in the B2 format had passed to the Rapida 76 — but that, as they say, is another story.
(c) PressInspection — Independent analyses and inspections of printing equipment.
Have you ever been dissatisfied because your smartphone started to freeze exactly one year after you bought it? Or because your printer started displaying a message about replacing the cartridge, even though the cartridge was not yet empty? Or maybe something suddenly broke down right after the warranty expired?

If so, you’ve encountered planned obsolescence — a system in which manufacturers deliberately limit the lifespan of their products. This is not a side effect of mass production and not merely cost-cutting on materials. It is a deliberate strategy designed to force you to buy new products instead of repairing the old ones.
This phenomenon has a very precise date and place of birth. On December 23, 1924, in Geneva, Switzerland, a group of industrial magnates gathered around a table and made a decision that would change the world forever. Among the conspirators was the much-loved Philips.
This story began with ordinary incandescent light bulbs — but its echoes are still felt today.
On December 23, 1924, while most of Europe was preparing for Christmas, a meeting took place in a Geneva hotel that would go down in history as the most successful industrial conspiracy of the 20th century. Around the table sat representatives of the world’s largest light bulb manufacturers.
From Germany came Wilhelm Meinhardt, head of Osram, who was the initiator of the meeting. The Netherlands was represented by Anton Philips, founder of the Philips empire. France by Compagnie des Lampes. The United States by top managers of General Electric, formally through its European subsidiaries. Also present were delegates from Hungary’s Tungsram, Britain’s Associated Electrical Industries, and Japan’s Tokyo Electric.
These men controlled virtually the entire global lighting market. And they had not gathered to compete — but to divide.
The organization they founded was given a noble title: “Convention for the Development and Progress of the International Incandescent Lamp Industry.” The founding documents spoke of “ensuring cooperation of all parties,”“efficient use of production capacity,” “maintaining uniformly high quality” and “improving lighting efficiency for the benefit of consumers.”
Behind these fine words lay a cynical truth. The cartel, named ‘Phoebus’ after the Greek god of light, had three simple goals: divide the global market, fix prices at a high level, and limit the lifespan of light bulbs to 1,000 hours.
Until 1924, manufacturers had proudly advertised durability. Ads boasted: “Our bulbs last 2,500 hours!” or “Guaranteed for 2,000 hours of service!” The Phoebus Cartel turned that logic upside down. From then on, no bulb was to last more than 1,000 hours — about 41 days of continuous use. It was a deliberate move to make products worse in order to sell more.
To understand why the leading bulb producers resorted to a global conspiracy, we need to look at the chaos of the early 1920s.
Electrification was sweeping the world. Cities were switching from gas lamps to electric light. New applications were emerging: car headlights, bicycle lamps, street lighting. The market was booming — or so it seemed.
But reality was brutal. Thousands of manufacturers entered the race — from global corporations to small workshops. Technology was evolving at breakneck speed:
in 1906, Tungsten paste lamps appeared,
in 1911, GE introduced pure tungsten filament,
in 1913, the gas-filled bulb, which produced five times more light for the same energy.
Each breakthrough turned millions of existing bulbs into scrap. Investments in factories were wiped out within months. No company could plan further than a year ahead.
Even giants were collapsing. In 1922–23, Osram sold a record 63 million bulbs in Germany. Just one year later, sales plunged to 28 million — more than a 50% drop.
Wilhelm Meinhardt realized the paradox: the better the bulbs, the fewer were sold. The solution was radical: limit bulb life to 1,000 hours, and consumers would buy 2.5 times more.
Meinhardt’s idea became reality. The Phoebus Cartel created the first truly global corporate conspiracy.
Each member received a production quota. For example, Philips’ Eindhoven factory could make 10–12 million bulbs a year, but the cartel allowed only 5.7 million. The rest of the capacity sat idle, keeping prices high.

The engineering challenge was clear: how to cut bulb life from 2,500 to 1,000 hours? Three methods were used:
Increasing current — brighter light, shorter life.
Manipulating voltage.
Modifying the Tungsten filament so it would fail sooner, but predictably.
By 1933–34, average bulb life dropped from 1,800 hours to 1,205 hours. No factory produced bulbs lasting more than 1,500 hours.
A Swiss laboratory enforced compliance: every plant had to send samples. The ideal result was exactly 1,000 hours. Longer life meant fines.
A famous case was Tokyo Electric: in 1927, its sales grew fivefold thanks to short-lived bulbs, but it was fined for exceeding quotas.
The scheme worked. In 1926–27, global sales reached 335.7 million bulbs. Four years later — 420.8 million, a 25% increase. Consumers replaced bulbs every 10–12 months instead of every 2–3 years.
Resistance within the cartel was crushed. Anton Philips angrily wrote to International GE: “After the enormous efforts we have made to escape the period of long-life lamps, it is extremely important not to slip back into that mire.”
By the late 1920s, the Phoebus Cartel controlled the global lighting market.
There were several main reasons for the collapse of the Phoebus cartel, and they overlapped:
Thus, the main reason for the collapse of the cartel was a combination of external factors: competition from independent manufacturers (especially from Japan), the loss of patent protection, and global crises (economic and military) that made it impossible to maintain international collusion.
Today, the Phoebus cartel’s methods continue to exist in a modernised form. Of course, manufacturers in many industries no longer engage in open collusion, as they did in 1924. But they need to sell more and more, so they use similar methods built into their business models.
By understanding their methods, we can draw conclusions and try to select equipment so as not to fall for marketing tricks. The company PressInspection is offering a service to optimise printing production plant.
Equipment is deliberately made less durable or non-repairable.
Software updates deprive devices of performance or compatibility.
A product goes out of fashion, even if it works properly.
Creating conditions in which the consumer is ‘locked’ into the brand.
Today, companies do not operate through direct international conspiracies, but through technology, licences and marketing, which effectively lead to the same result — a reduction in the service life of equipment and an increase in the frequency of purchases.
The principles introduced by the Phoebus cartel in the 1920s are directly reflected in printing equipment today. Only now we are not talking about light bulbs, but about printing and post-press machines, where manufacturers use more sophisticated mechanisms to retain customers.
Equipment is made to have a limited service life.
Software becomes a control tool.
Marketing convinces us that an old machine is ‘no longer reliable.’
The current trend is to ‘lock’ the customer into the ecosystem.
Risk of production stoppage: discontinuation of consumables = machine stoppage, even if the mechanics are in order.
Printing houses are always in an information vacuum and are forced to believe only what they find in sellers’ offers. With their charm, sellers can impose any ‘new’ equipment on them, according to the principle we described above.
However, the same goal can be achieved in a much less costly way. Three units of low-performance equipment can be replaced with one high-performance unit. The paper cutting line can be easily modernised and integrated into production. Within 2-3 weeks, we will conduct an audit of your production, after which we will offer several options for optimisation.
We guarantee that your gains will be significant.
In the early 1990s, the printing industry faced a major transformation: print runs were becoming shorter, deadlines tighter, and quality standards higher. It became clear that the industry could no longer rely on the same workflows as in the 1980s — with analog plates and numerous manual steps in preparing intermediate images on film. Printers needed a compact yet professional press for formats up to A3+, capable of automated offset printing previously reserved for B2 machines.
Throughout its last hundred years, Heidelberger Druskmaschinen AG has always tried to predict the direction of printing technology. Needless to say, it entered the 1990s with a rather diverse range of equipment.
The B2 format was represented by overlapping series: K-offset, S-offset, M-offset, and even SM72. However, for the rapidly developing A3 market, only the GTO, which was already becoming obsolete, was available. The simple T-Offset series covered the simplest jobs. But what was the point of its excessively bloated range of optional equipment? Just look at how many automatic feeders and delivery units were provided. But each of these options had to be sold.
The author of these lines remembers well his first trip to Heidelberg in 1998. And in the warehouse in Wiesloch, all these devices that had not found a buyer were still gathering dust on the shelves…One potential solution was to build a computer-to-press sheetfed offset machine based on the GTO 52 platform. However, that concept proved prohibitively expensive and required special printing plates. It quickly became obvious this was a niche product—not suitable for widespread adoption.

Another issue emerged: the GTO 52 platform, despite its strengths, lacked the architecture to support deeper automation. The cascade feeder could push the machine to 12 thousand sheets per hour, but there was no space for Autoplate, wash-up devices, or even remote control systems. A new, faster and more universal press was needed.
The answer came in 1994 with the launch of the Heidelberg Speedmaster SM 52. It was the first 36×52 cm format press with automation features on par with Heidelberg’s larger SM 74 and SM 102 models. It carved out a niche between basic models like the GTO 52 and full-size B2 presses — targeting professional short- and medium-run printing.
By 1995, the GTO line had reached its functional limits. No more automation features such as CPC were added. The cascade feeder was abandoned in favor of a speed cap at 8 thousand sheets/hour. All high-speed options were now reserved exclusively for the SM 52.
Now, over 30 years later, the SM 52 remains impressive in terms of automation and production capabilities.
The SM 52 utilized a central drive geartrain with helical teeth, just like the larger Speedmaster presses. This ensured smooth sheet transfer and high registration accuracy, even at speeds up to 15,000 sheets/hour.

1 – Feeder with vacuum belt and switchable from cascade to single-sheet mode, 2 – Alcolor dampening system, including Vario function, 3 – fully automatic sheet perfecting device, 4 – short ink unit mode, 5 – offset and printing cylinder wash-off devices, 6 – ink roller wash-off device, 7 – Autoplate automatic plate changing device, 8 – Coating unit with two-coating or chamber coating system, 9 – DryStar Combination dryer in extended delivery, 10 – high-pile delivery with Venturi nozzles

Its sheet feeder offered excellent precision, even with thin or coated stocks. Unlike the GTO 52, the SM 52 used a vacuum tape feed table. The feeder could run in both cascade and single-sheet modes — particularly useful when handling thick postcard stocks.
The inking unit was conventional: four form rollers and a sophisticated ink duct. CPC-controlled presses came with automatic ink zone adjustment. One- and two-color models often had manual ink key control, but even these featured laser-cut segmented ink knives and lever adjustments for easier calibration.
All SM 52 presses came standard with CPTronic, Heidelberg’s digital control system, allowing the operator to monitor and adjust machine parameters in real time. As early as 1995, the SM 52 was ready for the emerging CIP3/CIP4 standards — years ahead of many competitors.
Depending on the generation, the printing machines differed in colour. The first machines from 1995 to 2000 were painted in a classic dark grey. One of our customers at the time told me that he was buying Heidelberg because of their practical colour. However, in 2000, the side panels became silver. Due to the habit of leaning the printing plates against the sides of the printing machine, the SM52’s attractive design very quickly became a disadvantage. They even had to be repainted. In 2008, the panels were redesigned again and became convex.
The Heidelberg Speedmaster SM 52 became the most automated press in its class. Even by today’s standards, its feature list remains competitive.
Every machine was equipped with Autoplate automatic plate loading. Each printing unit had a dedicated wash-up system with separate solvent and water spray nozzles, plus a programmable wash cloth rotation system. The press allowed full control of wash sequence, volume, and solvent mix from the CPTronic console.
CPTronic allowed operators to predefine material thickness, speed, and dampening parameters—saving time on every makeready. These features wouldn’t become common among competitors until after 2000.

Operators could enter sheet length, width, and thickness into the control panel, and the press would configure itself in seconds.
The base model, SM 52-1, was a one-color press used for forms, tickets, and mono jobs. Two- and four-color versions followed, with the SM 52-4 becoming the most popular configuration for brochures, flyers, and catalogs.
In 1996, Heidelberg introduced the five-color SM 52-5+L with inline coating—making it the first B3 press capable of applying varnish in a single pass. In 2000, a six-color version (SM 52-6+L) was launched, ideal for premium packaging and commercial print.
There were two types of coating units offered:
Roller-type coating: Ideal for frequent job changes and quick varnish adjustments.
Chambered doctor blade system with anilox rollers: Preferred for repeat jobs requiring consistent, stable coating volumes.
Heidelberg also offered eight-color perfector models (SM 52-8P), which could print 4+4 with a perfecting unit.
Some machines with short delivery stacks were fitted with numbering and perforation units, commonly used for security documents, tickets, and business forms.
Customers could choose between standard and extended delivery configurations. Short delivery was simpler and less expensive, but limited the press’s ability to handle heavy stocks and long runs. Extended delivery was required for coating presses and could include IR dryers.
Varnishing units could be equipped with IR dryers and recirculation systems—especially useful when printing on coated paper or carton board.
The SM 52 was widely praised upon release. However, its premium price tag invited lower-cost imitators. These alternative machines sometimes won public tenders simply because their spec sheets looked similar on paper—even if their real-world capabilities weren’t comparable.
For example: Heidelberg’s integrated cloth wash-up system required the design of a tension-controlled winding mechanism (dry cloth roll costs about €5), fluid feed system, and programmable logic for adjusting cleaning cycles. The system cost more to build, but far less to operate. Some competitors simply offered pre-moistened cloths (€20 per roll) and called it “the same wash-up” functionality — getting the same tick mark in a tender evaluation.
Furthermore, some customers didn’t need a high-speed machine, nor did they want to pay for features they’d never use. But the GTO 52 could no longer meet modern requirements, and Japanese alternatives gained market share.
To capture the mid-range segment, Heidelberg launched a new line in 2003: the Printmaster PM 52. These stripped-down SM 52s featured minimal automation and lower price points, aimed at entry-level printers.
However, this caused confusion. The PM 52 looked like an SM 52 but lacked many of its key features: manual plate loading, no CIP3 interface, basic dampening controls, and simplified wash-up systems.
In 2008, Heidelberg discontinued the PM brand and consolidated all models under the Speedmaster SM 52 name again — regardless of their configuration or delivery height.
In 2006, a new configuration was introduced with a split inking unit, allowing part of the rollers to be disengaged. Only 12 from 16 rollers could work on small text jobs. This reduced ink buildup and contamination, and helped avoid over-inking.
In 2008, Heidelberg introduced segment-controlled transfer cylinders. The small format meant smaller-diameter sheet-handling cylinders, which caused issues when printing on thick stock. The new adjustable segments allowed stock up to 0.6 mm to run smoothly through the press.
As mentioned earlier, the Heidelberg Anicolor system was also born from the SM 52 platform. It virtually eliminated makeready waste and helped redefine short-run offset printing.
In 2012, Heidelberg rebranded the SM 52 as the Speedmaster SX 52, aligning with a broader corporate strategy. No major mechanical changes were introduced; the updates were primarily electronic.

The SX 52 featured a refreshed design, new control interface, and cloud-based integration via Prinect. Mechanically, it remained compatible with the SM 52—making both series easy to service as one family.
SX 52 versions were available with coating units, and some included Anicolor systems.
By the early 2010s, demand for 52 cm offset presses declined. Digital presses were rising fast. At the same time, no major offset “revolution” occurred. The Anicolor system catered to a narrow segment, while personalized digital presses largely overtook the Quickmaster DI’s market.
Commercial print jobs continued shifting to digital, especially in short-run advertising. Heidelberg also pivoted to digital solutions, and legacy models began to phase out.
The Quickmaster 46-4 DI was pulled in 2006, as Heidelberg ended its Computer-to-Print strategy.
One- and two-color QM 46 models were phased out in late 2005.
There’s been no formal announcement on ending the SM 52/SX 52 series, though Heidelberg’s website no longer lists them. Nonetheless, used SM 52s remain in active demand worldwide.
Today, used SM 52 and SX 52 presses are still in high demand in Eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. They’re well-suited for printing brochures, forms, packaging, hang tags, apparel labels, mini catalogs, and business cards.
They remain popular thanks to their reliability, print quality, and ease of maintenance.
With spare parts still available and many trained technicians on the market, the SM 52 remains a wise investment for printers who wish to stay in the offset sector.
The Heidelberg Speedmaster SM 52 was truly ahead of its time. Decades after its debut, it remains relevant for those who know how to get the best out of offset. In an era of supply chain constraints and rising B2 costs, the SM 52 stands as a true workhorse of modern print production.
Many clients — especially from the Caucasus and Central Asia — often ask me the same question: Which country is best to buy used printing equipment from? And each of them wants to buy a printing machine from… From Germany. of course!
It’s a logical concern. After all, printing machines are a major investment, and everyone wants to get the most value for their money. But the truth is, there’s no definitive answer. I’ve seen excellent machines that came from Africa, and completely worn-out ones from Germany. There’s no magic formula. The country of origin is just one factor, and not the most important one.
That said, it’s fair to say that the most reliable equipment typically comes from developed countries, where printing companies benefit from regular technical support and official servicing. When a country has authorized dealers for brands like Heidelberg, Komori, or Manroland, along with local spare parts warehouses and trained service engineers, machines tend to be maintained better and last longer. Access to fast delivery of parts is especially critical — even the best machine will eventually need replacements, and downtime can be very costly.
Clients often assume that “German equipment” automatically means quality. After all, most printing presses are manufactured in Germany. But this assumption is misleading. Yes, the machine may have been made in Germany — but what really matters is how it was used. In one print shop, the same model might be meticulously maintained, cleaned regularly, and operated within optimal parameters. In another, it might be neglected and pushed beyond its limits — leading to premature wear and performance issues.
One of the most underestimated factors is the human one. The way a machine was treated by the operator matters more than its location. A skilled and caring operator who follows proper maintenance routines can preserve even a 20-year-old press in excellent condition. On the other hand, careless handling can ruin a new machine in just a couple of years.
Another key aspect is how the machine is taken out of production. Who dismantles it? How is it stored and shipped? Sometimes the transportation process causes more damage than years of operation. So it’s essential not only to know the country of origin but also to assess who is responsible for removal, how it’s packaged, and who will handle installation and commissioning.
In short, the country can be a helpful indicator — but it’s not a decision-making criterion. If you’re working with a professional inspection service that tests the machine, verifies its wear and tear, and provides an honest technical report, the geography becomes less relevant. There are machines that have worked for decades in Eastern Europe or Guatemala and still produce outstanding results. And then there are others from Central European countries that are unrepairable after just a few years.
One of the alarming factors is always the presence of customs duties on spare parts in the country. The main question is how quickly the local dealer can deliver the spare part to the place of breakdown. If the spare part is delivered within a day, but customs clearance takes three to four days, the machine owner will make every effort to repair it using makeshift methods. As a result of such manipulations, the printing machine eventually turns into a monster with lots of homemade parts and repairs made with electrical tape and a soldering iron.
The takeaway is simple: focus on the specific machine, its condition, and its history — not just the country it comes from. And if you want to minimize risk, bring in an expert who can detect hidden flaws and give you a clear assessment. That’s exactly what we do.
For decades, Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG has been a trendsetter in printing technology. However, like any dynamic company, Heidelberg has had to adapt to changing market realities. In the early 1990s, the decision was made to discontinue production of the T-Offset sheetfed offset press and replace it with a more modern and versatile model, the Quickmaster QM 46.

The main difference between the Quickmaster QM 46 and its predecessor is its high degree of automation. An automatic plate setting system (instead of optional trays for T-Offset) has been added as standard. The offset cylinder has been equipped with an automatically connected quick wash device. To access it and drain the used chemicals, all you had to do was open the side cover and pull the wash module towards you.
The paper was easy to load into the machine thanks to the very convenient access. A new, very simple and modern control console was introduced. Overall, the machine looked modern and attractive, and it was really pleasant to work on.

You can read about the history of demonstration buses in printing at the link.
The Quickmaster 46 machine used not only standard offset plates, but was also capable of working with paper and polyester plates. Short 12-roller inking unit was more advanced than that of the T-Offset, but still limited in terms of adjustment accuracy. An automatic offset blanket washing device was standard equipment. The two-colour version featured sequential printing, which allowed simple two-colour production in a single pass. Formats up to 34×46 cm were supported with narrow-side sheet feeding, which made the machine attractive for small printing houses producing forms, business cards and flyers.
The Heidelberg Quickmaster QM 46 was released in two versions: single-colour (QM 46-1) and two-colour (QM 46-2). The machine was compact, with a straight sheet feed and a short paper path through the printing cylinder.
The two-colour machine had an unusual design: the two form cylinders could be shifted lengthwise relative to each other. They had a common offset cylinder, where two inks were combined simultaneously. The printing cylinder could also be shifted lengthwise and widthwise relative to the offset cylinder. In the pre-digital era, this provided good opportunities for placing the image in any part of the printed sheet.

2 – Ink fountain with steel fountain roller. From 2000 – with laser-slit ink blades
3 – Automated blanket wash-up device
4 – Numbering, impressing and lengthwise perforation in one pass
5 – Smooth output to the delivery, with sensor-controlled pile lowering and fans
6 – Inking and dampening systems with roller wash-up system for the second printing unit (option)
7 – Easy registration system
8 – Bearer-on-bearer running and helical gears for long service life and lastingly top quality
9 – Electronic sheet travel monitoring
10 – Central sheet-size setting for feeder and delivery
11 – Pile table for fast loading of piles in all formats.
It’s easy to notice that Heidelberg dispensed with a huge number of unused options that had been developed for the T-Offset. Their development and production had required enormous amounts of money and effort, but practice had shown that most of them were unnecessary. The new machine was as versatile and automated as possible for any customer from day one.
Despite its innovative approach, the Quickmaster 46 was an excellent addition to high-speed printing machines. It became a highly specialised machine for the commercial printing market. The design deliberately had a number of limitations that prevented it from replacing more expensive machines and prevented the Quickmaster from competing with them.Although the machine was designed for printing forms, business cards and other representative products, it still required time and paper for setup. An ordinary clerk could not print the number of copies he needed – the work still had to be done by specially trained personnel.
On a single offset plate, the inks had to be perfectly aligned, otherwise they would transfer from one ink unit to another and contaminate each other. The primitive push-type side stop did not ensure high-quality registration on the second pass of the sheet. It was impossible to print four-colour halftone work.
In addition, in the two-colour version, problems arose with ink registration when printing on thin materials at higher speeds.

The second important improvement was the redesign of the wash-off device. In the first generations, the surface of the rubber wash roller was easily damaged by unsuitable chemicals. It swelled, and printers, knowing the cost of a new roller, refused to use it anymore.
Finally, quite a few parts on the self-loading and delivery mechanisms became metal. The old plastic gears quickly fell apart. Therefore, if you choose the Quickmaster 46, we recommend paying attention to the second generation, which has silver side covers instead of lilac ones.
By the early 2000s, the market situation had changed dramatically. Budget digital copiers and printers, such as Xerox and Konica Minolta, entered the market, capable of printing full-colour runs with minimal preparation and cost. They offered speed, simplicity and low maintenance costs — exactly what the Quickmaster offset printer lacked. As a result, in 2005, Heidelberg officially discontinued the Quickmaster QM 46, focusing on the development of digital technologies in collaboration with Ricoh, as well as the promotion of more automated offset solutions in the mid-range and high-end segments.
\Despite its short life cycle, the Quickmaster QM 46 played an important role in the transition period between classic offset and digital printing. It was an important attempt by Heidelberg to create a compact, versatile machine for short-run printing. The Quickmaster 46 found its niche in many print shops for printing simple products so as not to take up the expensive time of machines such as the Speedmaster with automatic plate changing.
Thus, the abandonment of T-Offset and the Quickmaster QM 46 put an end to Heidelberg’s attempt to introduce offset printing in banks and copy shops. They were replaced by toner devices capable of producing high-quality prints from a single copy. These machines were a logical step in the history of a company striving to meet the needs of a new generation of customers and technical processes in an era of rapid digitalisation.
| Parameter | Specification |
|---|---|
| Printing process | Sheetfed offset (1 or 2 colors) |
| Max sheet size | 460 × 340 mm (18.11 × 13.39 in) |
| Min sheet size | 140 × 89 mm (5.51 × 3.50 in) |
| Max print area | 453 × 330 mm (17.83 × 12.99 in) |
| Plate format | 505 × 340 mm; thickness 0.15–0.2 mm |
| Stock thickness | 0.04–0.30 mm |
| Feeder pile height | 490 mm |
| Delivery pile height | approx. 540 mm |
| Printing speed | Up to 10,000 sheets/hour |
| Inking system | 12–13 rollers (3 form rollers per unit) |
| Dampening system | Alcohol-free direct-film (DDS) |
| Gripper margin | 7 mm |
| Noise level | < 80 dB (DIN 45635) |
| Power requirement | ~3 kW (240 V, 1 Ph, 60 Hz, 16 A) |
| Dimensions (L×W×H) | 1,500 × 1,270 × 1,530 mm (59.1 × 50.0 × 60.2 in) |
| Weight | ≈ 1,030 kg (2,270 lb) |
| Production period | 1995 – 2005 |
If you’re considering the purchase of a second-hand offset press, you’re not alone. But many buyers overlook hidden defects that can cost tens of thousands of euros. Here’s what we often find during on-site inspections:
Sometimes we encounter printing houses where the owner is reluctant to spend money on equipment maintenance. In such cases, one or even two units may become donors. When selling a machine, it is quite difficult to immediately estimate the cost of removed spare parts, as they are not always easily accessible.
The cost of identifying parts, ordering spare parts and installing them is a long and extremely costly process. Therefore, it is better to refuse such machines. It is unknown what the new owner will face when he fully realises the condition of such a machine.
Hybrid presses with UV dryers or special rollers may have been downgraded without proper documentation. Sellers often advertise factory specs, hiding the fact that key parts were replaced with cheaper parts for conventional technology. This could mean you’re overpaying for technology that’s no longer there.
One of these cases described here.
Another case is when the printing machine is located in a country where it is difficult to obtain the ordered spare part. Customs and payment difficulties lead to the printing house replacing original parts with Chinese counterfeits or getting rid of them altogether.
An issue no one talks about. If the original foundation was not built to spec — for example, not supporting the full perimeter of the press — it may cause vibrations, loosening bolts and damaging bearings. Once installed in your facility, these issues become your problem.
Older machines, especially those without chrome-plated cylinders, often show rust under the rubber blankets. This corrosion swells the surface and affects print quality, making it nearly impossible to achieve a stable print.
When spare parts are hard to get, some print shops make improvised repairs. We’ve seen soldered PCBs and hacked-together fixes that work temporarily — until they fail catastrophically. Electronic boards can cost up to €20,000 each.
Operators under production pressure often skip basic upkeep. Lack of lubrication, unserviced perfecting units, and clogged filters are common — and they all lead to expensive breakdowns.
Feeder and gripper issues are hard to diagnose without printing tests. Grippers can be bent, their pads can wear unevenly, and clamp opening slide bearings can break over time. All of this affects the drive. And it’s one of the most expensive systems to fix.
Devices like AxisControl or Densitronic S require regular cleaning, lubrication, and sometimes part replacement. But these are often forgotten. We even offer service for discontinued models.
Often, some service engineers resort to dumping policies to get an order for dismantling or assembling a printing machine. Not all of them are qualified. Some traces of their activities can be hidden, so you will not immediately see the results of their ‘work’.
Once the decision to purchase a new machine has been made, the printing house stops investing in the old machine. Delivery times for new printing machines have been increasing in recent years and can reach 9-15 months, depending on the configuration and the factory backlog. All problems and defects that arise during the transition period are passed on to the new owner.
Pro Tip: Always schedule two inspections — one before the deal, one before transport. Many of the above issues can only be spotted by a trained eye.
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Regardless of the printing technology used, dot gain of printing ink on the print is an inevitable part of the printing process. During printing, each dot of the halftone exceeds the area for which it was calculated. When it comes into contact with paper, it loses its correct round shape, and its deformation must always be taken into account both when manufacturing the printing form and when working on the printing machine.
Dot gain always affects colour reproduction, especially when the colour is formed by superimposing three or four basic triad colours, each of which has a small percentage content. When viewed with the naked eye, such a print appears slightly darker, and in shadows with a density of more than 80%, everything may merge into a solid block.
When selecting a used printing machine, it is important to determine which of the factors is responsible for the appearance of printing defects – incorrect adjustment of the compensation curves when outputting printing forms, excessive pressure, incorrect selection of the offset blanket or the poor condition of the equipment itself.
Dot gain has two components: natural, i.e. inherent in offset printing, and secondary, arising from violations of technology and adjustments of the printing machine. Natural dot gain can be roughly represented as the flattening of a drop of ink under pressure in the printing zone. This is where the name of the phenomenon comes from. But in reality, the process is much more complex.

Reflection of incident light from paper occurs not only on its surface, but also due to the scattering of light in the thickness of the paper. A shadow forms under the ink stain, so the intensity of the reflected light immediately next to the stain is lower than on the clean area of the paper. As a result, the stain appears to be slightly larger than it actually is. This effect mainly depends on the transparency of the paper.
The main thing to keep in mind is that it is impossible to determine the amount of dot gain correction once and for all. It occurs when using different types of paper, as well as increased pressure and ink viscosity. Even the same ink can spread differently at different temperatures.
Coated paper absorbs ink several times less than uncoated newsprint. On the latter, therefore, dot gain is much more noticeable.
Ink is applied to paper under pressure. Because of this, the area of fresh ink on coated paper increases. The degree of this increase, i.e. dot gain due to pressure, is mainly determined by the viscosity of the ink. Thick, highly viscous inks compress much less than more liquid ones. In offset printing, each dot of the halftone is surrounded by a thin halo of ink. This is because each dot has a microscopic relief and the ink flows to its edges.
In addition to these natural causes, various machine defects and process disruptions can lead to increased dot gain. The most similar to dot gain in terms of its effective nature is smearing. It occurs when the offset blanket slips relative to the paper in the printing zone or relative to the printing form in the contact zone.
Here are just a few reasons:
Even if only dot gain and ink smearing are taken into account, it is necessary to be able to correctly identify the nature of the defect when inspecting a used printing machine.
Technological causes of dot gain are eliminated by adjusting the printing process in a particular printing house. During the adjustment process, a specialist experiments with different papers and inks to find a solution to minimise the defect. In addition, the size of the halftone dot can be adjusted at the stage of printing plate output. The result of the adjustment will be the maximum approximation to the specified original and, accordingly, to the correct colour reproduction.
Problems caused by the condition of the printing machine are much more difficult and expensive to fix. That is why, when inspecting printing equipment before purchase, we focus on determining its mechanical condition. The causes of misalignment can vary greatly, from an incorrectly prepared foundation for the machine to maintenance problems.
But if you print a test in a printing house and find smudging, do not rush to blame the printing machine. Perhaps the printing house technician is to blame. Or the lack of a technician.
To determine the actual dot gain, it is necessary to print a halftone measuring scale. When exposing the printing plate, any dot gain compensation should be excluded. Using a densitometer, determine the optical density at the control points of the scale. The standard provides for measuring dot gain at 40 and 60 percent grey. In practice, it is often limited to determining the actual density at only one point – for 50% grey, since dot gain in the midtones and shadows leads to darkening of the image.
In the light areas of the scale, loss of detail and reduced contrast will be noticeable. In the deepest shadows, there will also be a loss of detail due to the mutual crushing of the halftone dots on top of each other. Density measurements should be taken at a minimum of five points. At the light end of the scale, at 100 shades of grey, use the cell where a regular halftone pattern appears. This usually corresponds to 1-4%. If the screen is detected at a higher density, it means that errors were made when exposing the form, and there is no point in taking further measurements.
At the opposite end of the scale, find the darkest point where the screen is still visible. For uncoated paper, this is around 80%, for good coated paper, approximately 90-95%. For the remaining points, use the cells where the density according to the densitometer corresponds to 25%, 50% and 75% with an accuracy of +/-1. The numbers of these cells (say, 2, 15, 42, 58 and 96, including the points at the ends of the scale 0 and 100) will be used to obtain the compensation curve.
It is impossible in principle to eliminate dot gain during printing. However, based on the results of our measurements, it is easy to construct a graph showing the degree of dot gain as a function of the density of the original screen (specified dot size).
This requires a non-linear correction, rather than a simple increase in brightness or gamma function, as is often done without considering the nature of the phenomenon. We have already taken the data for constructing the compensation curve from the densitometer. The values plotted on the vertical axis (the results axis) at the reference points – 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% on the horizontal axis – correspond to the numbers of the squares we mentioned above.
Dot gain should be measured not only for black, but also for the other three channels.
Next, you need to enter the compensation curve into the application you are working with. In Adobe Photoshop, for example, it can be saved to disk and then loaded at the final stage of image processing using the Image/Adjust/Curves command.
To obtain normal colour reproduction, the appropriate correction is made during the form preparation stage. For example, where there should be 50% halftone, 32% is set during exposure. During printing, 18% dot gain is added, and the printout has the desired 50%. It is clear that such a correction will only work if the dot gain is always constant.
Nowadays, it is difficult to find a printing house that does not have at least a primitive densitometer. But in practice, anything can happen. Of course, if you do not have a densitometer and you have difficulties with the exposure of the test scale or its printing in the printing house, you will not be able to construct an accurate curve. This will also be pointless if you frequently and randomly change paper and ink.
What can be recommended in this case? You can use the highly averaged compensation curves offered in professional graphics and layout software. This is not a panacea, but at least they will allow you to take into account the type of paper on which your work will be printed.
Whichever method you choose to combat dot gain – constructing accurate compensation curves or using the profiles supplied with the program – remember that compensation only needs to be done once. Either when preparing illustrations in a graphics editor or when outputting from the layout application.
A good technologist rarely changes the types of printing inks, and for the most commonly used materials, there are always pre-prepared sets of compensation curves.
The market for offset printing machines manufactured in Europe is changing rapidly: delivery times for new machines are getting longer, components are becoming more expensive, and demand for used equipment is breaking records. What is happening in the industry, why are used machines becoming scarce, and how can you protect yourself when buying? We analyse the key trends and share practical recommendations.
The last few years have been a serious test for the entire printing industry. This is especially true for European manufacturers of sheetfed offset printing machines. Whereas the situation used to be fairly predictable, today both manufacturers and end users of equipment increasingly have to work in conditions of uncertainty.
One of the main changes has been in the delivery times for new machines. What used to take 6–9 months can now take a year or even longer. The reason lies in global political and logistical problems: supply disruptions, rising delivery costs, and component shortages. This is a reality that must be reckoned with.
Components are a separate issue. Many key parts for modern printing machines are manufactured in China. Against the backdrop of rising prices for metal, electronics and logistics, the cost of these components is constantly increasing. In some cases, even the manufacturers themselves can no longer say exactly how much the final product will cost. It all depends on the current situation in the raw materials and transport services markets.
This background makes used equipment particularly attractive. The opportunity to purchase a working offset machine with a short delivery time and at a more attractive price is a real lifeline for many printing companies. But, alas, it is not all plain sailing here either.
Demand for used machines in Europe is currently breaking records. Models in good technical condition with a clear service history are particularly sought after. Such machines literally fly off the market, often before they are officially put up for sale. It is not surprising that more and more companies are starting to look for equipment in advance or are contacting suppliers directly with individual requests.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that owners of existing machines are now less willing to part with their equipment. Selling means risking being left without a replacement in the foreseeable future. As a result, the market for used machinery is gradually becoming increasingly scarce.
In these conditions, it is important to act quickly and strategically. If you are planning to buy a new or used machine, it is important to calculate the timing and budget with a margin. Better yet, work with trusted suppliers who not only sell equipment, but also help you find a solution that fits your needs and the market situation.
We recommend not taking any risks and always checking the technical condition of used equipment before purchasing. Our Press Inspection team offers professional inspection and audit services for offset printing machines. We work throughout Europe, quickly assess the condition of equipment and provide the objective information you need to make a confident decision.
Our experience confirms that even in unstable times, effective solutions can be found. The key is to be flexible, informed and one step ahead.
Our ‘PressInspection’ team was approached by a client from the Arab Emirates who asked us to inspect a KBA Rapida 106-7-LTTL printing machine to check its technical condition. The equipment was installed in a respected printing company which is specialized on package. It has been in the same place for the whole period of its operation. According to the manufacturer’s specification, the machine is equipped with both intermediate dryers for UV ink fixing and IR + UV modules for final drying after varnishing units.

The seller was in a great hurry to have the machine inspected by the customer. And in order for the machine to be reserved, the customer signed a contract and made an advance payment.

The printing house refused all our conditions, referring to the fact that they do not have paper of such density (it is a packaging printing house). In addition, it suddenly turned out that the printing house does not work on UV inks either. They don’t have it!
To the question ‘why so’, we received a rather reasonable answer. They say that we work with food packaging that has direct contact with food, and therefore we refused to use harmful technologies. But then the following questions arise: why did they buy a hybrid machine with UV dryers? It is much more expensive.
And the main question was: what rollers are currently installed on the machine?
The printing company claimed: no, no, all the rollers were still hybrid, and they could print with UV inks at any time. But this fact is not reflected in their contract with the supplier. Who will be responsible for additional expenses?
We were only provided with a printout of the factory order file of the printing machine from the KBA factory, which clearly stated that the machine was equipped with hybrid rollers. The machine was bought by a dealer according to the factory specification. The fact of evidence of hybrid rollers was also confirmed in words by the printing house.
The binding agent of UV inks is incompatible with the rubber of conventional printing rollers. If abrasive inks are applied to conventional rollers, they can quickly swell and fail.
UV rollers are slightly more expensive, but they do not work with conventional inks.
Hybrid rollers can work with both conventional and UV inks. But the cost of a set of hybrid rollers is about 2 times higher than the rollers for conventional printing. Thus, a machine buyer would have to invest more than 50 thousand euros to purchase seven new sets of rollers.
We offered to deliver our own UV inks and try to print the test with them. But the printer flatly refused. Firstly, unlike many other countries, in Italy it is customary to pay for the test printing time and consumables. The printer said it would entail a full wash-up process and preparation of the machine. Secondly, they don’t have people capable of working on UV inks and we need to order a printer from KBA from Germany. Thirdly, they can’t stop the machine for long. “See what we have and take our word for it!”
This is not the case when we can take their word for it. The price of the question is fifty thousand euros. We could not make a mistake.
Visually, it is impossible to distinguish hybrid rollers from conventional ones. Regular rollers are slightly softer (25 units on the Shore scale versus 35 for hybrid rollers). But after a few weeks of use, this is no longer distinguishable.
The technologist showed some old rollers in boxes that were probably brought in when the machine itself was purchased. The boxes were labelled, but it nothing said about the reality. The label looked very old. So the machine is equipped with hybrid rollers after all?

The printer, unsuspecting, brought us this invoice. After decoding the codes together with Boettcher, we got a disappointing result: the printer lied.
The rubber composition number 178 025 corresponds to the composition for conventional oil-based inks. Therefore, there are no hybrid print rollers in the machine. It is impossible to work with UV colours without replacing all the rollers.
This is a case where a negative result is also an important result.
The delivery contract has been signed and the advance payment has already been transferred. Based on our PressInspection technical report, the customer managed to prove to his supplier that the machine MUST be equipped with hybrid rollers for universal printing. To which the supplier reluctantly agreed.
1. Had the customer not ordered a report from Pressinspection.com and taken the printer’s word for it, he would have had to invest an unplanned fifty thousand euros in buying seven new sets of rollers.
2. If the dealer had ordered our detailed report when buying the machine from the printer, he would not have made a mistake in the contract specification and would have earned fifty thousand euros more.
3. If the dealer had not rushed the customer to sign the delivery contract before the inspection, he would not have been obliged to retrofit the machine with expensive rollers.
4. Never take anyone’s word for it: everyone pursues their own interests. Before you pay for the machine, order our written report. This will help you find the truth even if the machine arrives at your production facility without any components.
11 of March, 2025 is a special day in the history of printing. Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG is celebrating its 175th anniversary. For me, as the author of these lines, it is particularly significant that I have been close to the company for almost 7 per cent of its existence time.
The history of printing technology has been marked by continuous innovation, beginning with Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of moveable type in the 15th century. His letterpress printing technique, which involved arranging individual letters, inking them, and pressing them onto paper, remained largely unchanged for centuries.
The industry saw a major breakthrough in 1810 when Friedrich Gottlob Koenig developed the first high-speed printing machine. Shortly afterward, steam engines were introduced, accelerating the evolution of printing technology.
This period of innovation attracted millers, who were not only refining grain processing but also working on better mechanical systems. Among them was Andreas Hamm, the son of a miller, who in 1850 took over a machine factory and bell foundry in Frankenthal. In 1856, he partnered with Andreas Albert, an experienced printing press expert, and together they manufactured high-speed presses alongside other metal castings. By 1864, their products were being shipped internationally.
By 1873, Hamm and Albert had parted ways, becoming competitors in printing press manufacturing. Hamm, determined to advance the technology, introduced a high-speed cylinder letterpress in 1875, which found buyers as far as Egypt. Following Hamm’s death in 1894, his son Carl Hamm sold the company, which was then relocated to Heidelberg and renamed Schnellpressenfabrik AG Heidelberg in 1905.

Mergers and expansions further strengthened Heidelberg’s capabilities. In 1929, the company combined forces with Maschinenfabrik Geislingen (M.A.G.), enhancing its manufacturing potential. The 1930s saw further technological breakthroughs, including a fully automatic high-speed cylinder press in 1934. The company’s international sales, which once accounted for 60% of revenue, were disrupted by World War II, leading to a temporary shift in production to precision lathes and hydraulic equipment. However, post-war operations resumed swiftly, and by 1957, Heidelberg had established the world’s largest printing press facility in Wiesloch.
Hubert Sternberg was the company’s CEO for more than half a century. Under his leadership, all the machines that set the standard for printing worldwide were developed.
There is very little information about him on the Internet, but this man can undoubtedly be called the father of printing. This is the man who founded the DRUPA exhibition, which every self-respecting printer still considers a must-see. I dedicated my article to this great man’s influence on 20th century printing.
How Hubert Sternberg turned a small dirty factory into a global industry leader
Of course, this person has his own story of ups and downs. For example, inspired by the success of letterpresses, he switched to offset presses later than others. But better late than never. This man’s contribution to the printing industry is enormous, and without him we would definitely be at a different stage of development.
The latter half of the 20th century brought new milestones. By 1959, about 100 thousand Heidelberg presses were in operation worldwide. The company entered the offset printing market in 1962, initially resisted by Sternberg but eventually embraced due to its advantages. Despite economic downturns in the 1970s, Heidelberg thrived as demand for color printing grew in the 1980s. A second factory was built in Amstetten in 1985, equipped with advanced computerized systems. Three years later, the company acquired the American web offset manufacturer – Harris, expanding into a new market segment.
The eighties were marked by the active introduction of electronics into the production of printing equipment. Heidelberg was not left behind – the first devices capable of monitoring print quality in spectrophotometric coordinates appeared on the market.
The GTO-DI printing machine was capable of imaging the plate in the machine itself without the need for an intermediate exposure unit.
Heidelberg GTO-DI (1990-1994). Part 2. Computer-to-press technology appearance
The company first thought of creating a technology of rapid low-cost printing, which later grew into a whole direction – Quick Print Shop, whose baton today is carried by digital printing machines. The T-Offset series was the first attempt to create not just a stand-alone machine, but a whole range of equipment.
By the 1990s, Heidelberg was experiencing record sales, exceeding DM 760 million in the 1989/90 fiscal year. At DRUPA 95, the company introduced a new line of printing technology, enabling multi-color recto-verso printing with in-line coating and drying. The Quickmaster DI marked a shift to digital imaging, integrating laser technology for precision.
Under new leadership in 1995, Heidelberg pursued a transformation into a comprehensive systems provider, covering prepress, printing, and finishing solutions. The acquisition of Linotype-Hell, Stork Contiweb, and Sheridan Systems in 1996 expanded its capabilities. Joint ventures with CREO and Kodak followed, driving innovation in digital printing. Heidelberg also partnered with Microsoft for color control technology and collaborated with SAP for integrated media enterprise software.
The company’s financial achievements were solidified with its listing on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 1997, followed by inclusion in major European indices. Sales activities expanded, with direct marketing efforts reaching new regions, including Southeast Asia, Scandinavia, and Africa. In 1999, Heidelberg opened a state-of-the-art international spare parts center in Wiesloch to support its growing global operations.
Marking its 150th anniversary in 2000, Heidelberg inaugurated the Print Media Academy, a hub for industry knowledge-sharing. At DRUPA 2000, the company showcased innovations such as the Mainstream 80 rotary press and the Nexpress digital color press. Further acquisitions and strategic expansions reinforced Heidelberg’s status as a global leader in printing solutions, integrating finishing products and consumables into its portfolio.
Hugely unfortunately, the project PMA had to be scrapped. See how the Print Media Academy building looks today in our article.
By 1998/99, Heidelberg reported a high turnover of 7.7 billion DM (3.9 billion Euros), employing over 20 thousand people worldwide. The company strengthened its position in flexographic printing with a stake in Gallus Holding AG. It also expanded logistics operations, establishing the world’s largest graphics industry spare parts center in Wiesloch. In 1999, Bernhard Schreier took over as chairman, guiding the company into the digital era.
Heidelberg’s legacy of innovation and adaptability has positioned it as a dominant force in the printing industry, continuously evolving to meet the changing demands of the global market.
Surprisingly, the leading company in flatbed offset printing was the last of all manufacturers to come up with machines for this technology. The almost detective story of the development of the first offset machine is told in our article.
Heidelberg K-offset: first offset printing machine (1962-1986)
About Heidelberg’s most unsuccessful printing machine, which nevertheless laid the foundation for the development of high-speed printing.
Heidelberg Rotaspeed (1965-1976). The most unsuccessful Heidelberg’s printing machine
About the world’s most common printing machine in the Guinness Book of World Records
Heidelberg GTO (1972-2014). Part 1. A Printing Press From The Guinness Book of World Records.
About the unusual marketing that ensured that it wasn’t the customer who came to see the printing machine, but… the machine came directly to the customer for a demonstration.
The story doesn’t end there. We will continue to follow the history and development of the world leader in printing, which has been setting standards for the entire industry for 175 years.