Have you ever noticed that your smartphone starts “lagging” exactly one year after purchase? That your printer suddenly refuses to print, even though the cartridge is still full? That your favorite jeans wear out after just a dozen washes?

If so, you’ve encountered planned obsolescence — a system in which manufacturers deliberately limit the lifespan of their products. This is not a side effect of mass production and not merely cost-cutting on materials. It is a deliberate strategy designed to force you to buy new products instead of repairing the old ones.

This phenomenon has a very precise date and place of birth. On December 23, 1924, in Geneva, Switzerland, a group of industrial magnates gathered around a table and made a decision that would change the world forever. Among the conspirators was the much-loved Philips.
This story began with ordinary incandescent light bulbs — but its echoes are still felt today.

The Great Conspiracy

On December 23, 1924, while most of Europe was preparing for Christmas, a meeting took place in a Geneva hotel that would go down in history as the most successful industrial conspiracy of the 20th century. Around the table sat representatives of the world’s largest light bulb manufacturers.

From Germany came Wilhelm Meinhardt, head of Osram, who was the initiator of the meeting. The Netherlands was represented by Anton Philips, founder of the Philips empire. France by Compagnie des Lampes. The United States by top managers of General Electric, formally through its European subsidiaries. Also present were delegates from Hungary’s Tungsram, Britain’s Associated Electrical Industries, and Japan’s Tokyo Electric.

These men controlled virtually the entire global lighting market. And they had not gathered to compete — but to divide.

The organization they founded was given a noble title: “Convention for the Development and Progress of the International Incandescent Lamp Industry.” The founding documents spoke of “ensuring cooperation of all parties,”“efficient use of production capacity,” “maintaining uniformly high quality” and “improving lighting efficiency for the benefit of consumers.”

Behind these fine words lay a cynical truth. The cartel, named ‘Phoebus’ after the Greek god of light, had three simple goals: divide the global market, fix prices at a high level, and limit the lifespan of light bulbs to 1,000 hours.

Until 1924, manufacturers had proudly advertised durability. Ads boasted: “Our bulbs last 2,500 hours!” or “Guaranteed for 2,000 hours of service!” The Phoebus Cartel turned that logic upside down. From then on, no bulb was to last more than 1,000 hours — about 41 days of continuous use. It was a deliberate move to make products worse in order to sell more.

Why the Manufacturers Conspired

To understand why the leading bulb producers resorted to a global conspiracy, we need to look at the chaos of the early 1920s.

Electrification was sweeping the world. Cities were switching from gas lamps to electric light. New applications were emerging: car headlights, bicycle lamps, street lighting. The market was booming — or so it seemed.

But reality was brutal. Thousands of manufacturers entered the race — from global corporations to small workshops. Technology was evolving at breakneck speed:

• in 1906, Tungsten paste lamps appeared,

• in 1911, GE introduced pure tungsten filament,

• in 1913, the gas-filled bulb, which produced five times more light for the same energy.

Each breakthrough turned millions of existing bulbs into scrap. Investments in factories were wiped out within months. No company could plan further than a year ahead.

Even giants were collapsing. In 1922–23, Osram sold a record 63 million bulbs in Germany. Just one year later, sales plunged to 28 million — more than a 50% drop.

Wilhelm Meinhardt realized the paradox: the better the bulbs, the fewer were sold. The solution was radical: limit bulb life to 1,000 hours, and consumers would buy 2.5 times more.

How They Deliberately Made Products Worse

Meinhardt’s idea became reality. The Phoebus Cartel created the first truly global corporate conspiracy.

Each member received a production quota. For example, Philips’ Eindhoven factory could make 10–12 million bulbs a year, but the cartel allowed only 5.7 million. The rest of the capacity sat idle, keeping prices high.

The engineering challenge was clear: how to cut bulb life from 2,500 to 1,000 hours? Three methods were used:

1. Increasing current — brighter light, shorter life.

2. Manipulating voltage.

3. Modifying the Tungsten filament so it would fail sooner, but predictably.

By 1933–34, average bulb life dropped from 1,800 hours to 1,205 hours. No factory produced bulbs lasting more than 1,500 hours.

A Swiss laboratory enforced compliance: every plant had to send samples. The ideal result was exactly 1,000 hours. Longer life meant fines.

A famous case was Tokyo Electric: in 1927, its sales grew fivefold thanks to short-lived bulbs, but it was fined for exceeding quotas.

What the Conspirators Achieved

The scheme worked. In 1926–27, global sales reached 335.7 million bulbs. Four years later — 420.8 million, a 25% increase. Consumers replaced bulbs every 10–12 months instead of every 2–3 years.

Resistance within the cartel was crushed. Anton Philips angrily wrote to International GE: “After the enormous efforts we have made to escape the period of long-life lamps, it is extremely important not to slip back into that mire.”

By the late 1920s, the Phoebus Cartel controlled the global lighting market.

How the Cartel Collapsed

There were several main reasons for the collapse of the Phoebus cartel, and they overlapped:

1. Japan and small manufacturersThere were hundreds of small workshops in the country producing cheap lamps that did not meet the ‘1000-hour standard’. Their bulbs were both more durable and cheaper, so Japanese production grew from 45 million to 300 million units between 1922 and 1933. These goods flooded the export market and undermined the cartel’s position.
2. Expiration of General Electric patentsIn 1929, 1930 and 1933, GE’s key patents on incandescent lamp manufacturing technology expired. This dramatically lowered the barriers to market entry, and new players were able to manufacture products outside the cartel’s control.
3. The Great Depression (1929–1933)The economic crisis forced consumers to economise. The cartel’s sales fell by 20%, despite overall growth in the global lighting market.
4. Political factorsNationalism intensified in Europe, making international cooperation increasingly difficult. In the United States, authorities began investigating inflated prices.
5. World War IIAfter the war began, international trade virtually ceased. In 1940, the Phoebus agreement, which was set to remain in effect until 1955, was officially annulled.

Thus, the main reason for the collapse of the cartel was a combination of external factors: competition from independent manufacturers (especially from Japan), the loss of patent protection, and global crises (economic and military) that made it impossible to maintain international collusion.

 

How the Cartel Still Shapes Today

Today, the Phoebus cartel’s methods continue to exist in a modernised form. Of course, manufacturers in many industries no longer engage in open collusion, as they did in 1924. But they need to sell more and more, so they use similar methods built into their business models.
By understanding their methods, we can draw conclusions and try to select equipment so as not to fall for marketing tricks. The company PressInspection is offering a service to optimise printing production plant.

Physical obsolescence

Equipment is deliberately made less durable or non-repairable.

• Smartphones with glued-in batteries that cannot be replaced without servicing.
• Household appliances where plastic parts fail faster than their metal counterparts.
• In printing, post-press equipment, especially cheap Chinese equipment: parts have a limited lifespan and spare parts are unavailable.

Software obsolescence

Software updates deprive devices of performance or compatibility.

• Apple admitted that it slowed down older iPhones (the scandal of 2017). And the company was forced to pay a huge fine, which, nevertheless, was incomparable to the level of the scandal.
• HP and Epson printers block printing when they reach the ‘end of their service life,’ even if there is ink in the cartridge.
• In printing, digital machines: discontinuation of driver support, RIP system updates, or chipped cartridges renders the equipment useless.

Moral obsolescence

A product goes out of fashion, even if it works properly.

• Fast fashion: Zara, H&M, collections are updated every week, items become outdated faster than they wear out. We will not even touch upon the slippery slope of child labour in certain countries and the use of hazardous clothing dyes that wash out after a few washes.
• In technology, ‘new models’ are released every year with minimal changes, which psychologically pushes consumers to upgrade.
• In printing, manufacturers’ marketing: a new series of digital machines is positioned as a ‘mandatory standard’ for printing houses, even though the previous model still prints.

Systematic obsolescence through the ecosystem

Creating conditions in which the consumer is ‘locked’ into the brand.

• Car manufacturers integrate electronics in such a way that they can only be replaced by a dealer.
• In smartphones and household appliances, ‘original parts’ with serial codes are used, which are not accepted by the device during unofficial repairs.
• In printing, digital printing machines only work with ‘branded’ consumables with unique chips, and the manufacturer can stop producing them at any time.

Today, companies do not operate through direct international conspiracies, but through technology, licences and marketing, which effectively lead to the same result — a reduction in the service life of equipment and an increase in the frequency of purchases.

What It Means for the Printing Industry

The principles introduced by the Phoebus cartel in the 1920s are directly reflected in printing equipment today. Only now we are not talking about light bulbs, but about printing and post-press machines, where manufacturers use more sophisticated mechanisms to retain customers.

Physical obsolescence

Equipment is made to have a limited service life.

• Digital machines are designed for a certain number of ‘clicks’ (prints). Once the limit is reached, the printing modules need to be replaced — and this is almost always an expensive operation.
• Post-press machines from Chinese brands often have a low service life for bearings, motors, and electronics. They do not have a service base or adequate spare parts warehouses, so the machine often breaks down before it has a chance to pay for itself.
• The latest generation of offset machines contain more plastic and electronics than the classics of the 1980s and 1990s. Many parts cannot be repaired and have to be replaced as a whole unit.

Software obsolescence

Software becomes a control tool.

• Digital printing: most machines only work with proprietary RIP software and chipped cartridges. As soon as the manufacturer stops supporting consumables, the machine becomes scrap metal, even though it may be in perfect mechanical condition.
• Some models are blocked by updates: without the latest firmware, the equipment will not accept cartridges or start up.
• A similar situation occurs with CIP3/CIP4 interfaces and remote monitoring systems: older versions of the software are no longer supported, and the machine is ‘dropped’ from the production control chain.

General obsolescence

Marketing convinces us that an old machine is ‘no longer reliable.’

• Manufacturers release new lines every 2–3 years, and printing houses are led to believe that if you don’t have ‘LED-UV,’ ‘Push-to-Stop,’ or ‘Digital Hybrid,’ you are not competitive.
• However, the reality is that machines that are 10–15 years old continue to print perfectly well. But the market and customers are beginning to perceive them as ‘obsolete.’

Ecosystem dependence

The current trend is to ‘lock’ the customer into the ecosystem.

• Xerox, HP, Konica Minolta, Ricoh and other digital manufacturers use chips in cartridges and drums: they are ‘tied’ to a specific machine.
• In offset printing, original rollers, sensors, and boards are significantly more expensive than their analogues, but often the machine will not work without ‘branded’ spare parts.
• Manufacturers are increasingly selling equipment under ‘click contracts’ — in effect, the customer does not own the machine, but rents it and the consumables.

Consequences for the market

1. The service life of equipment is reduced: whereas offset machines used to operate smoothly for 25–30 years, many digital models are now written off after only 7–10 years.
2. Increased dependence on the manufacturer: printing houses cannot freely choose consumables and services, only the official channel.
3. Increased cost of ownership: the shorter the life cycle, the faster the equipment needs to be completely replaced.

Risk of production stoppage: discontinuation of consumables = machine stoppage, even if the mechanics are in order.

How we can improve the situation?

For printing houses that would like to reduce their costs in the constant race to purchase, we have prepared several packages for optimising printing production. How does it work? Let’s explain with an example.

Printing houses are always in an information vacuum and are forced to believe only what they find in sellers’ offers. With their charm, sellers can impose any ‘new’ equipment on them, according to the principle we described above.

However, the same goal can be achieved in a much less costly way. Three units of low-performance equipment can be replaced with one high-performance unit. The paper cutting line can be easily modernised and integrated into production. Within 2-3 weeks, we will conduct an audit of your production, after which we will offer several options for optimisation.

We guarantee that your gains will be significant.